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The cases which arose during the survey period add very
little to the Criminal Law of South Carolina. For the most
part, the cases turned on procedural questions which are
frequently raised by persons accused of crime. The cases
have been broken down into topics where possible and are
not given individual treatment.
Multiple Counts
A defendant may be indicted and sentenced for the sepa-
rate offenses of breaking and entering with intent to commit
larceny and grand larceny although both offenses arise out
of one act.' Breaking and entering with intent to steal is a
statutory crime2-while grand larceny is a common law
offense.
3
When a defendant pleads guilty or is convicted of two or
more counts alleged in the same indictment, the better prac-
tice is for the trial judge to separately assess the punishment
on each count;4 however, a sentence in gross which does not
exceed the total time which could have been awarded if each
sentence were separately assessed and then added together, is
not error.5
Escape
Although a void sentence is imposed upon a defendant,
he is subject to punishment for an illegal escape while he
is serving such sentence. A person who is illegally restrain-
ed must test the question by the proper procedure. It is no
defense to a charge of escape that the defendant is innocent
of the crime charged or that the original conviction could be
declared void in a habeas corpus proceeding.6
McKay, McKay, Black, and Walker, Columbia, S. C.
1. Copeland v. Manning, 234 S. C. 510, 109 S. E. 2d 361 (1959).
2. SOUTH CAROLrNA CODE OF LAWS § 16-332 (1952).
3. Copeland v. Manning, supra note 1.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid. See Ex parte Klugh, 132 S. C. 199, 128 S. E. 882 (1925) which
is cited in the Copeland case. See State v. Mayfield, 235 S. C. 11, 109 S. E.
2d 716 (1960) which apparently followed Klugh also.
6. Copeland v. Manning, 234 S. C. 510, 109 S. E. 2d 361 (1959).
1
Ross: Criminal Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1961
SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA LAW
Relaxation of Procedural Requirements in Criminal Cases
The cases which arose during the survey period continued
the policy of the Court to relax rules of procedure in order
to insure that persons accused of crime have every oppor-
tunity to prove their innocence. The liberality of the Court
is most often demonstrated by the willingness of the court to
review questions on appeal which were not in issue in the
trial court.7
Presumption of Regularity
The Court frequently resorts to the presumption of regu-
larity in criminal cases especially when the defendant rests
his appeal on the ground that the trial court failed to comply
with procedural requirements. In the Britt cases the Court
considered the contention by the appellant that he was not
present when the trial court conducted the voir dire examina-
tion of the jurors, even though this was not raised in the
trial, but the Court concluded that even if the contention
had been raised the record would affirmatively show that
he was present, but in absence of this in the record, the
Court would presume that the examination had been con-
ducted in his presence.
In State v. Mayfield,9 the defendant contended that he was
not arraigned and the jury was not sworn. The case was
further complicated by the loss of the original notes of the
trial by the court reporter. The Court, in addition to invoking
the presumption of regularity, accepted the affidavits of the
reporter and some of the jurors that the defendant had been
arraigned. 10 A statement by the appellant that the jury was
not sworn, by itself, is not sufficient to overcome the pre-
sumption of regularity."
Alibi
The defense of alibi is not an affirmative one and there-
fore the trial judge committed no error in charging the jury
with the law applicable to alibi even though the appellant
did not put up witnesses to establish this defense, where the
7. State v. Mayfield, 235 S. C. 11, 109 S. E. 2d 716 (1959); State v.
Britt, 235 S. C. 395, 111 S. E. 2d 669 (1959).
8. 235 S. C. 395, 111 S. E. 2d 669 (1959).
9. 235 S. C. 11, 109 S. E. 2d 716 (1959).
10. The court also held that the appellant had waived whatever objec-
tion he might have had by his voluntary entry of a plea and by going to
trial without objection.
11. State v. Mayfield, supra.
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examination of the prosecution witnesses revealed that the
appellant might have been in a different place at the time
the crime was committed. 12
Newly Discovered Evidence
A motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence
is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. A defend-
ant making such a motion for a new trial must show that
the evidence on which the motion is based:
... (1) is such as would probably change the result if
a new trial is had; (2) has been discovered since the
trial; (3) could not have been discovered before the
trial; (4) is material to the issue; and (5) is not merely
cumulative or impeaching .... Is
The credibility of newly discovered evidence is a matter
for the consideration of the trial judge in deciding whether
to grant a new trial. The trial judge was held to have prop-
erly exercised his discretion where the affidavits comprising
the after-discovered evidence stated that the deponents had




In State v. Collins'5 the appellant was prosecuted in Ker-
shaw County for his failure to support his wife and minor
child. The wife alleged that she was forced to leave the
appellant husband by reason of his physical abuse of her,
while they were residing in Athens, Georgia. The wife re-
turned to the home of her mother in Kershaw but thereafter
the husband did not furnish any support for her or the child.
The appellant contended that the trial court did not have
jurisdiction over him. The Court, affirming the lower court,
held that the husband was guilty of constructive desertion
by which the wife was forced to seek refuge in Kershaw
County. In relation to jurisdiction, the Court held that the
breach of the husband's duty to support his wife and child
first occurred in Kershaw County and that it was this fail-
ure which violated the non-support statute, 6 and the venue
was therefore proper.
12. Ibid.
13. State v. Mayfield, 235 S. C. 11, 109 S. E. 2d 716 (1959).
14. Ibid.
15. 235 S. C. 61, 110 S. E. 2d 270 (1959).
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Jurisdiction of Children's Court
In State v. Gorey,17 the Court held that the State Consti-
tution s prohibited the jurisdiction of the crime of murder
upon any court inferior to the circuit courts. In view of this
prohibition, the contention by the thirteen-year old appellant
that his case should have been channeled through the Chil-
dren's Court of Spartanburg County19 was not valid. The
Court properly held that the statutory provisions establishing
the jurisdiction of the Children's Court could not divest the
circuit court of the power to take direct supervision, but as
a matter of policy it seems such cases should be referred to
the Children's Court. This court could be invaluable to the-.
circuit courts in providing a solution to the problem of what:
to do with a thirteen-year old boy who is charged with mur-
der. To treat a child of this age in the same manner asi
adults is to defeat the humanitarian policies of the Legisla-
ture in setting up children's courts.
Continuance
The age old tactic of continuance in criminal trials was
considered in two cases during the survey period. The Court
disposed of these contentions, citing numerous cases, by say-
ing that:20
[A] motion for a continuance is addressed to the
discretion of the trial Judge and his disposition of such
motion will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown
that there was an abuse of discretion to the prejudice of
the appellant....
Although the Court is more prone to find an abuse of dis-
cretion in criminal cases than in other proceedings,21 abuse
of discretion was not found in either case.22
17. 235 S. C. 301, 111 S. E. 2d 560 (1959). The appellant was charged"
with the murder of another boy. He was convicted of manslaughter but
the Supreme Court ordered a new trial because the trial court failed to
instruct the jury on the law applicable to involuntary manslaughter.
18. S. C. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1895).
19. The Children's Court of Spartanburg County is established pursuant
to CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 15-335 (1952). Appellant contend-
ed that § 15-336 of the South Carolina code was applicable which provides,
"in case any child under sixteen years of age is charged with a serious
criminal offense the judge of the Children's Court may certify such case
to the Circuit Court of Spartanburg County for disposition."
20. State v. Bullock, 235 S. C. 319, 111 S. E. 2d 657, 661 (1959) ; State
v. Britt, 235 S. C. 395, 111 S. E. 2d 669, 674 (1959).
21. See State v. Livingston, 223 S. C. 1, 73 S. E. 2d 850 (1952) on whick,
appellant relied.
22. See State v. Bullock, supra note 20; State v. Britt, supra note 20.
8171961]
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Confessions
In State v. Bullock23 the appellant contended that the con-
fession used against him was involuntary and should have
been excluded. The Court adhered to the rule laid down in
,earlier cases that a confession must be voluntary to be ad-
-missible and the proof of the voluntary character must be
,established by the prosecution. The question of the voluntary
.nature of the confession is addressed to the court in the first
:instance. If there is a question of fact to be determined
.as to the voluntariness of the confession, it is then submitted
to the jury for final determination as to its voluntary nature,
and in any event the jury will determine its truthfulness. 2
4
Judge Whaley25 calls this process the "pig tracking doctrine."
The Court held that the trial judge did not commit error
in this case by submitting the issue of voluntariness of the
confession to the jury.
26
In State v. Brooks2 7 there was an appeal from a conviction
of rape by the appellant, a young Negro man. The case does
not present any points which need to be discussed, but it is
interesting to note that while the appellant was charged and
convicted of raping only one person, the evidence proved28
that the appellant had raped two women during one trans-
action. The prosecutrix and her companion testified that the
appellant had raped them in turn holding a gun on both of
them during both acts. The credibility of this testimony has
been established by the jury, still it is hard to believe that
a male could maintain control of one woman in an open
street with a pistol while raping another. It would seem
that there should be a rebuttable presumption that this is
physically and mentally impossible.
23. 235 S. C. 319, 111 S. E. 2d 657 (1959).
24. State v. Bullock, supra note 20.
25. WHALEY, SOUTH CAnoINA EVMENCE, 9 S. C. L. Q. at 35 (No. 4A
1957).
26. State v. Bullock, supra note 20.
27. 235 S. C. 344, 111 S. E. 2d 686 (1959).
28. Evidence of the separate crime was held to be admissible on the
ground that it tended to prove a common "scheme or plan embracing the
-commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of
tone tends to establish the others". Id. at 350, 111 S. E. 2d at 690.
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